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Abstract
The affective turn, which has already questioned dominant paradigms in many 
disciplinary fields including cultural studies, philosophy, political theory, 
anthropology, psychology and neuroscience, has started to attract more attention 
in the field of ethnomusicology, becoming a particularly vibrant stream of thought. 
Drawing on the voices that call for the historicisation of and critical deliberation 
on the field of affect studies, the article strives to show how theories of affect 
might expand dominant paradigms in ethnomusicology and also points to their 
limitations.
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“Everything that occurs without praiseworthy affects [in music] 
can be considered nothing, does nothing and means nothing” (Der 
vollkommene Capellmeister, Johann Mattheson, 1739).
Music has often been taken as an example of the power of affect. 
Its ubiquitously distributive affective potential has become pivotal 
in the works of scholars advocating the affective turn.2 Spurred by 
the poststructuralist orientation towards language, representation, 
deconstruction and psychoanalysis, a perspective in which body, 
emotions and embodiment have been neglected (see Clough and 
Halley 2007), the affective turn shifted the focus to pre-, extra-, 
and paralinguistic aspects and introduced a non-discursive, non-
representational approach (see Thrift 2007). Developed mainly in the 
2000s and partly inspired by research on the emotions and the body 
conducted in feminist and queer studies, affect theory is currently 
attracting growing interest in a variety of disciplinary fields. There is 
no single, uniform affect theory; affect has multiple and sometimes 
even conflicting definitions. The affective turn also cannot be seen as 
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separated from other “turns”: the sensory turn and the material turn that 
have also emerged in scholarly discourses of the last fifteen years and 
that have played prominent roles in a new emphasis on embodiment, 
material substance and the senses. Drawing on the works of Spinoza, 
Bergson, James and particularly Deleuze and Guattari, Massumi, 
Chouse, Thrift and Connolly, the main conceptualisation of affect 
is that it is a state of relation as well as the passage of vital forces or 
intensities beyond emotions (Gregg and Seigworth 2010: 1). Affect 
is seen as a potential, a bodily capacity to affect and be affected. It 
is embodied in the automatic reaction manifested in the skin, on the 
surface of the body and in the heartbeat, but it is still something that 
goes beyond the body, a passage from one experiential state of the 
body to another (see Massumi’s definition in Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: xvi). However, that body is not exclusively human, but can 
also be animal or plant, crowd or social body, singing body or the 
body of a musical instrument.3
The emphasis on affect as a theoretical and methodological 
concept in recent scholarly accounts proves that it is becoming a 
particularly vibrant stream of thought in the field of music studies. 
Yet has it already become a nuanced analytical category? Or, to quote 
Grossberg (2010: 316), has affect become “everything that is non-
representational or non-semantics”, since we have not yet done “the 
actual work of parsing out everything that is getting collapsed into 
the general notion of affect”? Has affect become a conceptual outlet 
for any kind of “sensorial, emotional, visceral” approach to music 
that merely reopens/re-actualises old-fashioned binaries between 
mind and body, cognitive and somatic?4 What is the risk in using 
the conceptual tools of affect theories, given the current broader 
social, cultural and intellectual climate? Is the usage of affect really 
an epistemological shift that offers a new path for theorizing music 
and sound? Is the emphasis on the affectivity of music an ideological 
and political statement?
This article explores the potentialities and limitations of the 
affective turn in ethnomusicology. Following the view that call for the 
historicisation of and critical deliberation on the field of affect studies, 
it aims to trace the genealogy of the concept in ethnomusicological 
scholarly works. For that purpose, in the first part of the article I 
offer a highly condensed view (giving a brief sketch rather than deep 
analysis) of the dominant approaches to affect in ethnomusicological 
accounts. Unlike the authors who recently theorized the affective turn 
3  For theory on the material agency of the nonhuman or the not-quite-human, see 
Benett 2010. For this issue within ethnomusicology see Roda 2014.
4  Such a critical appraisal of the affect theories has already been made in other fields of 
the humanities, particularly by feminist, queer and postcolonial scholars; see Hemmings 
2005. 
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in music scholarship in the volume Sound, Music, Affect: Theorizing 
Sonic Experience5 and reported on the limited amount of studies in 
contemporary music scholarship dedicated to sound and music with a 
focus on affect (Thompson and Biddle 2013: 18), which presupposes 
affect theory as a naturalisation of the epistemological equipment 
from “another” field, I would like to claim that the conceptualisation 
of affect has long been a ubiquitous part of ethnomusicological 
research. As summarised by Charles Seeger, who stressed that 
“music is communication of world view as the feeling of reality” 
(1977), the special connection between music, on the one hand, and 
affect, emotions and feelings, on the other, has remained a hot topic 
for generations of scholars. Going beyond affect alone, the affect/
emotion relationship that today appears as one of the most sensitive 
questions within the affective turn proves to be the most persistent 
paradigm when theorizing music and sound experience. I believe that 
this relation should be given particular attention, as it provides access 
to some pivotal questions of the affect theory itself. Discussing recent 
scholarly accounts on affect in light of the long tradition of thought 
about affect and meaning in music is not meant as a revitalisation of 
a psychological approach, which appeared to be dominant yet limited 
explanatory framework. The goal is to rethink the affective turn as a 
radical paradigm shift and to point to important continuities that can 
help us to detect the conceptual points where the affective turn has 
something new to say in music studies. 
This article attempts to show complex epistemological stances 
on affect in the ethnomusicological accounts, and particularly 
the ways the affective turn has influenced the revitalisation of the 
existent paradigm and/or deepened existing deadends. Analysis of the 
recent studies suggests that affect is a constant area of investigation 
in various overlapping branches of music research (musicology, 
ethnomusicology, music theory, sound studies, cultural anthropology 
of music, music education etc.). Although I strive to be cautious 
in thinking about the disciplinary differences within the dominant 
conceptualisations of affect6 and to take the point of view that seems 
to me to be relevant to ethnomusicology, my analysis inevitably 
includes accounts from musicology, music education and music 
theory, but also sound studies and human geography. This is also due 
to the lack of dialog among these disciplinary fields, which, I believe 
5  This volume can be seen as a result of the growing interest in affect in the field of music 
scholarship in the last several years, as visible in the number of conferences organised 
on this topic and in the large number of panels and individual papers dedicated to it at 
the international conferences and annual meetings of ethnomusicologists. 
6 As Gregg and Seigworth warn about confuting philosophy, psychology, critical race 
studies and feminist standpoint theory, among other fields, which all have their own 
disciplinary differences when conceptualizing affect (2010: 316).
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should be fostered. Still, such an overview tends to reduce a variety 
of parallel voices and paradigms to the dominant stream. From the 
wealth of thought about affect, I selected those studies relevant for 
my examination. This proved to be even more challenging after 2000, 
when scholarly production related to emotions and affect became 
particularly vibrant. Influenced by the critiques from the discursive 
and linguistic-centred approaches, the rapid blossoming of studies 
addressing these topics meant that many of them quickly become out-
dated or neglected. As a result, my literature preview is selective and, 
despite my personal wish to focus precisely on these theoretical and 
conceptual “leftovers”, this article still focuses on the most resonant 
works in the field.
Affect, an Ancient Topic in Music Studies7
Affect in music and musical affect are topics that have 
occupied intellectuals and scholars since Antiquity. In his overview 
of rhetoric and music, Blake Wilson provides a valuable insight 
into the terminological changes and conceptual transformations of 
“affect” from Aristotle, Plato and Cicero8 to Baroque rhetoric and the 
terminology of music theorists in the late 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, 
who all acknowledged the power of music to control and direct 
the listener’s “affects” (in this case equated with emotions): “the 
association of rhetoric with the concept of the Affects can be found 
almost continuously in the history of music from at least the end of 
the 15th century” (Wilson et all. 2012). Wilson further reflects on how 
affect was rationalized and understood in perspectives that categorize 
and describe types of affect as well as the affective connotations of 
scales, dance movements, rhythms, instruments, forms and styles.9 
His overview demonstrates that past theorists established no single 
“theory” of affect and shows that, since the 15th century, scholars have 
faced the same stumbling blocks when approaching this concept. In 
that sense, it proves that thinking about affect is nothing radically 
new, due to the long legacy of criticizing discursive and linguistic 
approaches in music scholarship.
Although his work is not related to ethnomusicology, Wilson’s 
overview excellently illustrates the continuous interest in the “music-
affect problem” that later emerged in the works of scholars in the 
late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, mainly within 
7  Paraphrasing David J. Elliot, who opens his article with the intention of revisiting the 
ancient topic of musical affective experience (2000: 79). 
8  For considerations on this topic in Antiquity and in Christian, Jewish and Muslim 
religious thought, see Garofalo 2010: 727.
9  For more on the understanding of affect, see Wilson 2012. 
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the field of musical psychology.10 As early as 1951, Suzanne Langer 
warned her readers that language’s discursive nature is less congruent 
with musical forms than feelings (Langer 1951). In his seminal work 
Emotion and Meaning in Music, Leonard Meyer theorizes musical 
affect while arguing for a more nuanced theoretical and analytical 
approach to the general claim that musical works and performances 
communicate feelings and emotions. The main concerns of the 
theorists, he asserts, appear to be the relationship between the affective 
stimulus and the affective responses (Meyer 1956: 13), and he notes 
the difficulty of sorting out particular musical processes that evoke 
affective responses (ibid.). Meyer’s epistemological background 
negotiates two rival views of the absolute meaning of music and 
the nature and value of the experience involved in the perception 
and understanding of the relationships that constitute a musical 
work. Therefore, he builds on behaviourism (discussing emotional 
and affective behaviour), arguing that, although emotion or affect 
is in itself undifferentiated, affective experience is differentiated 
because it involves awareness of a stimulus.11 In this sense, the 
stimulus itself and awareness of it are equally important in Meyer’s 
conceptualisation of musical affect, which will become meaningful 
for the further discussion of sonic affect in the second part of this 
article. Like Meyer, Malcolm Budd too suggests a tendency to 
a succession of both natural and learned automatic responses to a 
stimulus (1985: 159).12
Several dominant tendencies marked these early thoughts 
about affect. Studies took a subject-centred approach to emotion and 
affect, which they used interchangeably. Based on the psychological 
theory of emotions, their main field of enquiry was the particular 
musical pattern or character that evokes a response and a particu-
lar psychological change in listeners. Affect is thus inseparable from 
perception: music’s power to generate emotion lies in the listener 
who “understands” the music (Budd 1985: 160). Scholars discussed 
music in relation to self-ness, self-growing and self-transformation 
as a part of the behaviourist paradigm. On the other hand, Meyer 
acknowledges the importance of bodily aspects: “Other aspects of 
affective behaviour, such as skeletal and muscular adjustments, have 
been said to be automatic, natural concomitants of the affective re-
sponse. These will be called ‘emotional reaction’” (Meyer 1956: 17). 
In a similar way to Meyer, Budd also provided theoretical ideas about 
10  For more about this early peak, see Juslin and Sloboda 2010: 934.
11  Two instances of emotion are the same kind if and only if they involve an awareness 
of the same kind of stimulus situation.
12  However, he criticized the argument that focuses on the tension that music creates 
in the listener.
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the body, drawing on Pratt, who discussed the movements both of 
and within the body. Budd argues that our body can move about, be-
ing itself a locus of movements, and that some of these movements 
are felt by kinaesthesia and organic sensation (1984: 38–39). Howev-
er, these claims remained the “leftovers” within the dominant focus 
on cognitive and psychological aspects. Scholars generally favour 
the brain and consciousness, maintaining the dichotomy between 
body and mind. Most work on the subject seeks to identify positive 
emotions and draws on the thesis that the emotional consequences of 
experiencing music are that people feel joy in being themselves and 
in being in tune with others. Such views also do not reflect on the fact 
that what is defined and seen as ‘positive feelings’ might actually be 
ambivalent, unsettled and unpredictable emotional state, or in Ngai’s 
words, “a meta-feeling in which one feels confused about what one is 
feeling” (Ngai 2005: 14). Also, dominant research trajectories main-
tain the dichotomies between the aesthetic and technical characteris-
tic of music and social and historical circumstances, stimulus/biolo-
gy-based and sociological/culturally constructed perspectives and a 
generally essentialist approach to emotion and affect. The dominant 
hypotheses and proposals presented also resonate in the debates and 
disagreements in recent scholarship, as will be examined more close-
ly in the following section. 
Theories of Musical Emotion 
In the early 1990s, scholarly works were galvanised by an 
increasing interest in the field of music and emotion, reviving the 
“old” studies of Meyer, Berlyne and Clynes (see Sloboda 1991 and 
Le Doux 1996). As Juslin and Sloboda (2010: 935) assert in their 
overview of the field, this topic has become an accepted area of 
research with a broad range of topics, theories and methods. Although 
heterogeneous in their approaches, the majority of works on musical 
emotion are situated in music physiology as the central epistemological 
framework. The main question that scholars have raised is how 
music produces its emotional effects. They pursue the questions of 
the very existence/essence of musical emotions; mechanisms through 
which music arouses emotion; social processes related to these 
emotions and the issue of applied scholarship (particularly in therapy 
and healing). In the interpretation of Juslin and Sloboda, the term 
“musical emotions” is shorthand for “‘emotions that were somehow 
induced by music’, without any further implications about the precise 
nature of these emotions” (2010: 10). Many of the studies were based 
on experimental work conducted by ethnomusicologists and music 
psychologists. Bernard Lortat-Jacob and some other scholars were 
interested in the potential existence of musical universals related to 
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the expressive meaning of music (Fernando et al. 2014; Lortat-Jacob 
1998). Musical meaning, as something that is communicated between 
performers and listeners through musical affect, has been the subject 
of a continuous line of thought in theorizing the aesthetic experience 
of music and sound (see e.g. Shepherd and Wicke 1998; De Nora 
2000). In his introduction to the special issue of Ethnomusicology 
Forum, Martin Clayton says that the ethnomusicological theory of 
musical meaning is “something I consider to have been a pressing but 
unfulfilled need for many years” (2001: 2).
Simultaneously, another shift towards biology and neurobiology 
is being made, with the idea of combining neurobiology, perception 
studies and the psychology of music. The influence of this “affective 
neuroscience” appears to be particularly strong: experimental methods 
have included various ways of measuring musical responses – self-report 
measures, psychological measures, measuring neurological changes 
and hormonal activities, as well as behavioural measures of affect 
(see Västfjäll 2010). Another stream of research observes music and 
emotions with a focus on technological and new media-based processes 
(Becker 2004: 5). In general, the dominant approaches welcome 
empirical research and focus on applicability in various fields, such as 
music education, music therapy, health, film music and marketing.
While addressing the cognitive and physiological dimensions 
of musical emotion phenomena, scholars have shown awareness of 
the limitations of this approach: some have argued for the importance 
of analysing the musical discourse and behaviours that occur in a 
given socio-historical context and the need to combine the cultural 
anthropological approach with the cognitive psychological one. As 
Judith Becker asserts, some also claim the importance of embodiment 
for the cognitive model and propose “embodied cognition” or 
“distributed cognition” (2004: 5). Approaches based on biology, 
neurology and psychology, in particular, have started theorizing 
the body as a structure within which cognition and emotion occur. 
Yet many of the works remain ambivalent about the role of music 
experience beyond the mind and perception. In line with the subject-
centred approach, scholars give priority to listeners: “the most 
common motive for listening to music is to influence emotions”, 
often with an accompanying affective reaction of some sort (Juslin 
and Sloboda 2010: 3). A focus on listeners also attempts to offer a 
more nuanced interpretation of psychoanalytical aspects of music’s 
visceral experience, as is suggested by David Schwarz, drawing 
on Lacan and Žižek (1997: 2). Many scholars focus on rhythmical 
entrainment as an “aesthetic emotion”, drawing on the concept of 
entrainment from social psychology.13
13  Due to the limited scope of this article, I am not able to further discuss works that 
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Approaching affect from the perspective of practice, David 
J. Elliott proposes the concept of multidimensional affect, which is 
built on the individual’s cognitive-musical processing abilities and 
implies that there are many layers of personal and social meaning 
“to ‘locate’, apprehend, construct, and feel emotions about in 
musical work” (Elliott 2000: 85). Drawing on Bowman’s ideas of 
human audition, he warns of auditory ambiguity, the fact that it is 
phenomenally fluid, affecting the listener’s aesthetic experience – for 
example, through individual attachments to memories of particular 
sound patterns, or appreciations of personal response to the musical 
expression of emotions they cognize (ibid.: 86).
In line with the previous works, these studies consider the same 
conceptual questions when thinking about the affective in music, an 
emotion that is sui generis or specifically musical (Budd 1985: 30). As 
I will show later, constructing a viable theory that can be built either 
upon the idea of an emotion that is specific to music, or upon the idea 
of emotion per se, is still one of the main points of disagreement in 
recent thinking about affect. 
The Emotion-Affect Relationship Unveiled
In the majority of the presented studies, emotion and affect 
appear as parallel and interchangeable concepts. This conceptual 
division/relationship has been one of the main stumbling blocks in 
recent scholarship, which thus displays many points of contradiction. 
In Тhe Affect Theory Reader, Grossberg asserts the continuing 
difficulty of theorizing affect and emotion, due in part to the way 
the historical trajectory of these terms has been used to dismiss and 
trivialise (Grossberg 2010: 316). Music scholars already noted this 
complex discursive relationship between emotion, feeling and affect 
in the mid-20th century. Meyer defines this relationship as blurred, 
but sees affect as a concept used to mark undifferentiated feelings: 
“Much confusion has resulted from the failure to distinguish 
between emotion felt (or affect) and mood” (Meyer 1956: 7). For 
him, as interpreted by Budd, the character of affect involved in the 
different kinds of emotion is always the same and, in itself, affect 
is neither pleasant nor unpleasant (1985: 156). Juslin and Sloboda 
reflect on the “terminological confusion” in the field of music and 
emotion due to the different ways scholars use the words “affect”, 
“emotion”, “feeling” and “mood”. They distinguish between these 
terms: emotions refer to a quite brief but intense affective reaction; 
focus on entrainment. For more about this, see Tia de Nora's pivotal study Music in 
Everyday Life (2000) and Clayton's, Sager's and Will's discussion of the concept of 
entrainment in ethnomusicology (2005).
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mood is used to denote affective states that are lower in intensity 
than emotions, while feeling refers to the subjective experience of 
emotions and moods (2010: 10). Juslin and Sloboda define affect (in 
music) as the overarching concept that “comprises anything from 
music preference, mood, and emotion to aesthetic and even spiritual 
experiences” (ibid.: 9).  They also express hesitation to use the 
term “affect”, since the main journals in the field increasingly use 
“emotion” rather than “affect” (ibid.: 10). However, this stance is 
difficult to justify, as the scholarly work on affect in other fields of 
the humanities provides a detailed analysis of this conceptual duality 
based on the core debates among theorists. 
Although “affect” and “emotion” are often used as synonyms 
(Rice 2008), affect theorists such as Massumi claim that these terms 
follow different logics and different orders: feelings are personal 
and biographical, emotions are social, while affect is pre-personal 
(2002: 28, 40). Grossberg claims that emotions should not simply 
be described as affect, even when they are considered configurations 
of affect: “I have always held that emotion is the articulation of 
affect and ideology. Emotion is the ideological attempt to make 
sense of some affective productions” (2010: 316). Such views 
draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between affection as a 
relational state of a particular body manifested in feeling, emotion 
or perception on the one hand, and affect as an intense force on the 
other (see 1987: 281). Emotion thus resides on the side of subjective 
affirmation, as a subjective capture of affect (Schrimshaw 2013: 31). 
For many scholars in the humanities, affect is seen as a “raw material” 
for emotion, while emotion enables the social, political and cultural 
articulation of affect. 
Nevertheless, some scholars claim that Grossberg’s and 
Massumi’s conceptual distinction between affect and emotion cannot 
be sustained (Leys 2011: 434). In Leys’ opinion, such approaches 
actually reaffirm the false dichotomy between conscious and signifying 
(emotional and intellectual), on the one hand, and unconscious and 
affective (a process of intensity not tied to signification) on the other. 
For Leys, certain strands of theory, especially in the work of scholars 
inspired by Deleuze (and Guattari), reinforce the same dualism (the 
mind and the body or matter) of the subject that it seeks to criticise 
and duplicate an old paradigm (ibid.: 450). Sianne Ngai also argues 
that this split actually has methodological roots and originated 
in psychoanalysis’ methodology for distinguishing third-person 
feelings from those of the first person, where affect serves an observer 
perspective, while emotions belong to the analysed ego (2005: 
25). Similarly, for Sara Ahmed, the distinction between sensation 
and emotion can only be analytic (2004: 6). As I strive to show in 
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the following sections, I believe that precisely the fields of music 
and sound can be used to show the importance of this conceptual 
distinction as an analytical tool, but also its unproductivity when it 
comes to theorizing our (music) realities.  
Theories of Sonic Materialism
Affect theory’s most important impact is in proposing affect as 
prior to intentions, meanings, reasons and beliefs – as non-cognitive, 
corporeal or automatic responses. For the theorists who argue for its 
autonomy, affect is an inhuman/trans-human, pre-subjective, non-
signifying, unconscious intensity, disconnected from the subjective 
(see Massumi 2002). In other words, humans apprehend the world 
on two separate but unequal tracks: intention and affect, meaning and 
sense impressions, perception and experience; thus they co-exist but 
do not merge or commingle (Clough and Halley 2007: 200, see also 
232). According to Clough and Halley, affects are defined in terms of 
their “autonomy from conscious perception and language” (ibid.: 209). 
So, despite persistent warnings that “affect and cognition are never 
fully separable” (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 2–3), body and sign 
nonetheless function and can be analysed on ontologically separate 
planes, as a matter of “parallel processing” (Clough and Halley 2007: 
198). The difference in kind between affect and meaning, experience 
and representation, sense and significance, is a categorical assumption 
of affect theory. According to Lawrence Grossberg, affective states 
are neither structured narratively nor organized in response to our 
interpretations of situations (1992: 81). Theorists also argue that affect 
is independent of, and prior to, ideology, “the third state between 
activity and passivity, occupying the gap between content and effect” 
(Massumi in Thompson and Biddle 2013: 6). However, it is precisely 
this “autonomy of affect” that is the main source of debate and 
criticism among scholars. Feminist and queer scholars, in particular, 
argue that affect cannot be pre-political but is continuously mediated 
by social and cultural locations and identities. Others propose that 
affect’s relative autonomy is its most important critical and political 
value, as asserted by Bryan J. McCann: “It is simultaneously subject 
to capture while retaining the potential for complete or partial escape 
– if only to be captured once again” (2013: 409). 
It is this dual nature (autonomous and entrenched) that also 
seems to be a crucial stumbling block when discussing affect in 
relation to sound and music. In most of the recent theoretical studies 
of the affective potential of sound and music (the works of Kassabian 
2001, 2013; Gilbert 2004; Bull and Back 2003; Cusick 2006, 2008; 
Goodman 2010; Garcia 2011; Voegelin 2014 and Hofman 2015), 
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the analyses focus on sound as affective vibrational force. These 
approaches generally call for “sonic materiality” and focus on sonic 
affect as the “nonrepresentational ontology of vibrational force” 
(Goodman 2010: xv). These calls follow the ideas of scholars who 
have extensively theorized the ontology of sound and the nature of 
auditory experience, particularly in the field of sound studies (Nudds 
and O’Callaghan 2009: 6). Recent scholarship, moreover, proposes 
that sound is vibrational affect that exists above and beyond the ear, 
resonating in our bodies (see e.g. Goodman 2010 and Price 2011). 
Several scholars have anticipated this shift from the ear alone to the 
visceral/somatic experience of sound and have asserted the automatic 
bodily responses as the important part of music’s aesthetic experience. 
From a different angle, Will Schrimshaw proposes sound 
not only as an intentional object of auditory experience, but as a 
physical process whose ontological status is neither reducible to, 
nor dependent upon its being heard (2013: 40). This means that 
vibrational regimes also exist beyond our conscious perception and 
that affective aspects in sound not only resonate with parts of the body 
other than the ear, but also go unheard (ibid.: 43).14 A good example is 
brain-wave music, which has lots of frequencies that our ear cannot 
actually detect as “sound”; another is the difference between human 
and animal auditory perception.15 Schrimshaw thus challenges the 
distinction between quality, experience and affirmation, on the one 
hand, and intensity, quantity and autonomy, on the other (2013: 39)  
In his opinion, what complicates our experience of sound is that it 
exists separately from audition: “non-sound” is filled with inaudible 
but affective signals that resonate in bodies. He argues that affects 
therefore do not need anthropic, subjective relational extension; 
their perceptions are seen as independent of the state of those who 
experience them (ibid.: 31). In his conceptualisation of sonic affect, 
he draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that art’s affect persists 
beyond the experiential; it is a block of sensations independent of the 
affected and the affecting, as it is independent of both the creator and 
the perceiver (2003: 164). 
In attempting to think of the affectivity of music and sound 
as facilitating acoustic entry into the affective fields, Schrimshaw 
goes even further, claiming that sound itself can be a synonym for 
affective autonomy (2013: 40). In the introduction to his approach to 
sonic materialism, itself built upon the paradigm of the “autonomy of 
14  Sonic intensity that is not manifested in experience yet is nonetheless real vibration 
or frequency beyond the range of audition (ibid.: 36). 
15  Steven Feld’s study Sound and Sentiment from 1982 not only argues for including both 
human and non-human (natural) sounds and musical sounds through an acousticological 
approach, but also takes into consideration cultural and social levels, sentiments and 
emotions – all as the assemblage that should be addressed in the analytical process.
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affect”, he stresses that the focus is on the “surplus” of sonic matter 
beyond its symbolic and subjective affirmation (ibid.: 30). And it is 
precisely this issue of the inaudible territory of sound that seems to 
have existed alongside the main inquiry in music scholarship, using 
a different conceptual vocabulary: although scholars from the field of 
cognitive ethnomusicology and those focused on musical emotions 
have situated their approaches within an opposite paradigm of music, 
as necessarily embedded in subjective affirmation, they recognize 
the limited access to the internal processing of sound experience. 
They are aware that it is not possible to catch the totality of aesthetic 
experience, claiming that “emotion” and “feeling” do not capture 
everything relevant to our experience of music. In addition to the 
emotions experienced, “flow”, “spirituality”, “altered states” and 
“vitality affects”16 constitute a part of the more complex “aesthetic 
experience” (Juslin and Sloboda 2010: 940). Some studies go beyond 
the subject-centred “perceptual” paradigm, introducing the concept 
of “unconscious affect” and “pre-attentive affective behaviour” 
(Winkielman and Berridge 2004), which can exist without conscious 
experience. They report that it is not possible to capture “all aspects 
of affect” and that the subjective experience of affect is only one 
component of the “affect chain” (Västfjäll on Carver 2001). 
From a different theoretical perspective, Martin Clayton uses 
the rasa theory originating in Indian “dramaturgy” to examine the role 
of affect in musical meaning. The word rasa, meaning literally ‘juice’ 
or ‘essence’, suggests something flowing and dynamic (2000: 2) – a 
fluidity that Becker calls “aesthetic essence” or “aesthetic emotion” 
(2004: 11). In discussing the application of the rasa theory to music 
(which “remained underdeveloped”), Clayton asserts the importance 
of thinking within “the irreducible domain of sound – something from 
which Western musicology could certainly learn” (2000: 13). Despite 
his main focus on the “perceiving subject” and musical meaning, 
he contends that music experience can occur well before we have 
a chance to come to any definite conclusions, even subconsciously, 
about the music’s tonality, motivic or formal structure or metrical 
regularity (ibid.: 8).
The main challenge related to the experiential aspects of 
music and sound has to do with the long-lasting paradigm that affect 
(and emotion) engenders in the listener through a direct experience 
(performance or listening). For the theory of sonic materialism, in 
contrast, the main obstacle appears when the sound is reduced to 
the subjective and the real is identified as intentional, as an object 
of experience. One of its main aims is to blur the line between the 
16  For more about vitality affects, see the Handbook of Music and Emotion (Gabrielsson 
and Lindström 2010: 367–400). 
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experience of sound as intentional, on the one hand, and inescapable 
everyday activity, on the other, an aim deriving from the belief that 
literally everything vibrates – whether object or ecology, idea, event, 
feeling or process.17
“Experiential Messiness”18
The dialectical subject/object relationship and the dichotomy 
between intentional/unintentional appears to be the main focus of 
recent scholarly works fostered by the affective turn. Views of sonic 
materialism argue for the autonomy of affect as a pre-subjective, pre-
political force and have raised the most important issues regarding the 
experience of sound and music. Such stances presuppose objective/
subjective sounds, manifested also in the dichotomy between inaudible 
and audible. Maria Thompson and Ian Biddle point out that, in terms 
of sound and music, affect theory can be seen as contradictory, in that 
it strives to focus on the listening/performing bodies, but at the same 
time on what is beyond the audible and the bodily experience: “on the 
one hand, it looks for the orders or regimes of feelings (it is something 
connected, that is, to the bodily) and yet, on the other, seeks to allow 
for nodes of connectivity that sometimes (often) omit or bypass our 
bodies” (2013: 13). Such views are based on the assumption that we 
are either fully intentional or fully unintentional beings, which is one 
of the main points of the critique of the affective turn (see Leys 2011).
Employing the concept of affect need not reduce either the 
source or the given abilities of the subject to experience the sound. 
Sound is not a result of the interaction between subject and object, as 
Voegelin asserts; the very nature of sound exceeds the subject-object 
dichotomy: “a formless form that is neither object nor subject but 
the action of their materiality formlessly forming as liquid stickiness 
that grasps me too but leaves no trace” (Voegelin 2014: 2). The 
materiality of sound as mobile and fleeting cannot be captured as 
a noun, but only as a verb – as a process of contingent materiality 
(ibid.) – or, as proposed by Born, contingent on multiple materialities 
(2011: 377). Ethnomusicologically speaking, people experiencing 
music and sound invest their own affective dispositions, moods and 
emotions, and although they are open to the affective environment, 
they are not just empty vessels for impersonal affect (Garcia 2011: 
186).19 The body’s activities to process sound only partly determine 
17  For more about the concept of resonance and sounds as affective vibrations that 
resonate, see Gershon 2013.
18  I use Sara Ahmed’s expression (2010: 30). 
19  The authors working on musical emotions also assert that more work needs to be 
done on interpersonality, since music evokes emotions not only at the individual level 
but also at the intergroup and interpersonal level – a kind of “collective emotions”, 
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how people experience and articulate sonic affect. Schrimshaw also 
asserts that we have to consider sonic affect’s conceptual as well as 
material existence, which does not require us to abandon relatedness 
in favour of objective essentialism: “In thinking affective autonomy 
as interior to and in excess of both experience and representation, the 
problem of the in-itself attains an exteriority capable of conceiving 
alterity beyond the anthropic themes of linguistic and conceptual 
correlationism” (2013: 42). 
I believe that we should go further and rethink the gap between 
representation and affect, since, to cite Elliot, representations 
are considered to have their own affects as well (2013). Although 
challenging the idea of representation is the very essence of the 
affective turn, I argue for moving beyond a reductive binarism 
between the representative/discursive and the sensorial/affective 
realms. To quote Sara Ahmed, “I do not assume there is something 
called affect that stands apart or has autonomy” but rather that it 
is something related to the “messiness of the experiential” (2010: 
30). In her deliberations on the trans-subjective, unpredictable and 
free-floating circulation of affect and its autonomy from subjects, 
objects and signifiers, she asserts that although affect flows through 
and between, it may also “stick” (2004: 11). For theorizing about 
sonic affect as impersonal intensity and force, I agree that auditory 
experience is much more than just hearing or the bodily experience 
of the sequences of sound. It is multi-layered and marked by extra-
auditory experiences based in the social context of the moment of the 
experience. To return to Salomé Voegelin’s point, it is the inaudible 
and imperceptible aspects of sound, sounds that remain unheard or 
that we cannot or do not want to access, that make us aware of social, 
political, cultural, ideological and other prejudices and limitations 
(2014: 7). For her, the sound experience is gendered, racialised, and 
ethnicised as a framework of everyday life, the sensorial meaning of 
our realities. It warns us of the invisible on the socio-political frontline 
and talks about the plurality of (music) realities – materialities, 
ideologies and subjectivities. Our aesthetic, social and political 
realities are embedded in our experience of sound, as experienced 
and created though sensory engagement/action. 
In that sense, I believe that the affective turn’s productive 
potential does not lie in abandoning the semiotic, representational 
and discursive paradigms, but in the production of meeting points for 
the semantic and affective dimensions/venues at the site of the sound 
experience.20 Recent ethnomusicological works seem to follow this 
emotions as a part of the dynamic social system (Juslin and Sloboda 2010: 944).
20  For more about the limitation that affect theory sees in the semiotic model, see 
Atanasovski, this issue. 
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course, focussing on the affective contours of various music genres 
such as fado (Gray 2013), rap (McCann 2013), punk (Tatro 2014), 
popular music in general (Gitzen 2013) and partisan songs (Hofman 
2015), or focussing on the affective linkage between gender and genre 
(Krell 2013). These studies aim to produce new insights into the role 
sound plays through affective technologies in the context of current 
realities. They also remind us that affective economies of sound 
and music are necessarily contextualized and individualized. They 
elaborate on music’s affective capacity in constituting collectivities 
and its emancipatory potentials in alternative modes of political and 
cultural production. Some of the studies also argue for the need for 
a critical stance towards affect as a method, recognising not only its 
positive or emancipatory aspects, but also its destructive ones, which 
have to be grasped to avoid romanticisation. As Steve Goodman 
(2010) and Suzanne Cusick (2008) caution in their fundamental 
studies, affect is also manipulated as a tool for controlling lives, 
by claiming that it offers a “promise” in the neoliberal corporate 
world. I would warn of another potentially dangerous aspect of the 
romanticisation of affect: the tendency to assign to it an inherent 
authenticity – understanding affective economies in music and sound 
as inherently authentic and moral, which is at the core of its promise 
for (any kind of) potentiality.  
Limits of the Theorizable
“Making my own ‘affecting presence’ out of a Kaluli myth 
takes me back to Armstrong’s ‘being’, ‘feeling full experience’, 
and ‘witnessing’ in the process of discovering how form incarnates 
feeling,” wrote Steven Feld in 1982 (2012: 236).This quote vividly 
describes the intensity of the emotional investment, sensory 
experiences and affective technologies of the fieldwork environment 
as a spectre of affects that is derived in a very concrete moment and 
particular spatio-temporal context. 
Claiming that theory is practice, several scholarly works 
propose affect as methodology, as an empirical research practice 
(see Coleman and Ringrose 2013; Gershon 2013).21 Aware of the 
gaps between theory and practice, they argue for affect as a tool for 
detecting potential options and possibilities in understanding our 
realities. “The affective relations are fleeting, emergent, contingent, 
and sensual apprehensions,” write Waitt, Ryan and Farbotko (2013: 
9), acknowledging that we live in a world that we can only partially 
understand, where many things are inherently unknowable. As 
21  Lawrence Grossberg warns that the modalities and mechanisms of the affective must 
be more carefully examined (2010: 328).
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Becker states, trance cannot and need not be explained (2004: 2). Her 
statement emphasizes the material aspects of our research realities 
that cannot be represented, are missing or are impossible to theorise. 
This also points to the important modulations between scholarly 
reflections and the reality of everyday life, which, in Claire Bishop’s 
words, “rarely provide more than fragmentary evidence, and convey 
nothing of the affective dynamic” (2012: 5). This becomes even more 
challenging if, as Nagel Thrift asserts, “consciousness shows up as 
short-term because of the artificiality of the situation demanded by 
the researcher” (2007: 7). Moreover, scholarly accounts also have 
their own affects. How can we deal with that experience of reality that 
goes beyond and works against cultural gravity, constantly escaping 
theory? Can affect be the analytical category that enables us to create 
a valuable account of the dynamic encounters made through music 
and sound? 
Since thinking about affect is always writing about it, writing 
about affect (in music and sound) calls us to think about “invisible 
agency” – invisible mobility, sticky liquidity, actions and engagements, 
rather than artefacts, outcomes and visible relationships – and is an 
effort to access the invisible, “that which is barely there and yet 
influences all there is” (Voegelin 2014: 2). It attempts to catch the 
uncatchable – small bodily reactions, whispers and the energy of the 
moment; the liveliness of a world in flux, or in constant becoming, 
to use the Deleuzian concept. It struggles with the challenge of 
articulating a singular narrative about the “onflow” (Pred 2005) of 
everyday life, its materiality and reality, catching the moment of 
“right here, right now”. 
Affect as a methodological tool also shows us how and why 
this invisibility deeply influences not only our realities, but also the 
production of knowledge about these (music) realities. Voegelin 
claims that our engagement with sound as affect goes beyond what 
we actually perceive, showing us the possibilities rather than enabling 
us to recognise the perceived reality (2014: 4). I also suggest that 
affect leads us back to the question of ethical honesty in confronting 
the limits of the knowable (in a knowledge-based economy) and the 
obligations (or our mutual implication within global capitalism) that 
we share and to which we are bound. This appears particularly potent 
when affect is employed to gain new capacities to act politically – in 
the first place, in its role in the re-evaluation of reason and rationality 
in politics, ethics, and aesthetics. This can also be understood as an 
ethical act that addresses important questions of agency in the “crisis 
of representation for qualitative researchers”, as Gershon warns 
us (2013: 259). He asserts that, by providing additional affective, 
sensory and other information in ways that text cannot, we may be 
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able to remove a layer of authorial translation from a text and provide 
the opportunity for others to be heard in their own voices (ibid.). 
I have acknowledged from the start that this discussion 
demonstrates that it cannot fulfil the goal of being all-inclusive, even 
if it pretends to. Rather, it demonstrates the plurality of the origins 
of thought on affect and affectivity in music and sound, neither as an 
epistemology nor an ontology, but as many parallel and competing 
lines of inquiry. It points to the importance of opening more in-
depth discussions about affect within current ethnomusicological 
scholarship and offers some of the possible directions for these 
discussions.
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Ана Хофман
ЗАОКРЕТ КА ПРОУЧАВАЊУ АФЕКТА У 
ЕТНОМУЗИКОЛОГИЈИ
(Резиме)
Студије афекта, које су већ довеле у питање доминантне парадигме у 
хуманистичким дисциплинама, укључујући студије културе, филозофију, 
политичку теорију, психологију или антропологију, постепено добијају све 
већу пажњу у области етномузикологије као изузетно вибрантно подручје 
промишљања. Подстакнут предоминацијом постструктуралистичког при-
ступа и наглашавања дискурзивног и репрезентације кроз деконструкцију 
и психоанализу у којима су занемарени телесно, емоционално и сензорично 
(видети Clough and Halley 2007), теоријски заокрет ка афекту усмерава фокус 
на пре-дискурзивно, пре-лингвистичко кроз не-дискурзивни, не-репрезента-
тивни приступ (видети Thrift 2007). 
Чланак истражује потенцијале увођења теорије афекта у подручје етно-
музикологије. Ослањајући се на приступе који позивају на историзацију и 
контекстуализацију теорија афекта и њихову критичку расправу, чланак пра-
ти генеалогију концепта афекта у постојећим научним дискурсима. У ту свр-
ху у првом делу чланак нуди поглед на доминантне приступе у теоретизацији 
концепата афекта и емоције у етномузиколошким научним наративима. Пре-
ма мом мишљењу, стављање нових студија о афекту у музици и звуку у шири 
историјски и дисциплинарни оквир посебно је важно јер 1) афект и емоције 
представљају две најзначајније коегзистентне парадигме када су посреди 
етномузикологија и сродне дисциплине 2) у теоријама афекта однос између 
концепата афекта и емоције појављује се као један од најосетљивијих питања 
и главни предмет научне дебате.
Чланак има за циљ осврт на комплексне епистемолошке мреже које об-
ликују увођење концепта афекта у етномузикологију и посебно начине на 
којe то утиче на ревитализацију постојећих парадигми или/и продубљивање 
постојећих концептуалних ћорсокака. Анализа доминантних приступа по-
тврђује да је афект константни предмет занимања дисциплина које су фо-
кусиране на истраживања музике и звука (музикологије, етномузикологије, 
теорије музике, културне антропологије музике, музичког образовања, звуч-
них студија и сл.). Стога се у чланку афективни заокрет не третира као нату-
рализација епистемолошког апарата из „другог” научног поља и не пропитују 
се начини на које постојећа истраживања одговарају на њега. Чланак заправо 
жели да покаже да је афект саставни део етномузиколошких епистемологија 
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од њених самих почетака па до данас; заокрет ка афекту није „помодни” те-
оријски тренд, већ теоријски и методолошки оквир који је већ дуго времена 
свеприсутни део етномузиколошке истраживачке праксе. 
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